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Military Occupation Currency
DOMINIQUE G. CARREAU*
This article presents a modern survey of a State's monetary
rights and duties during and after military occupation of another
State. The belligerent occupant has broad monetary powers to is-
sue currency, control financial institutions and regulate in re-
sponse to military necessity. In contras the Hague Regulations
impose upoi the occupant a few, general obligations which can
be construed to limit the occupant's unreasonably inflationary
actions or total destruction of the occupied country's economy.
The author concludes that international law governing the occu-
pant's conduct is loose and lenien4 as a result of a general lower-
ing of the pertinent standards in modern times.
INTRODUCTION
Seventy-five years ago when the Hague Regulations "respecting
the laws and customs of war on land"' were adopted, a topic of
military occupation currency would have been, if not unthinkable,
at least wholly academic. This does not mean that currency did
not play any role in the preparation and conduct of wars, but it
constituted a matter of domestic rather than international con-
cern;2 the one noticeable exception was counterfeiting enemy cur-
rencies, 3 which had long been practiced despite an almost
* Professor of Law, University of Paris I-Panthdon-Sorbonne. Visiting pro-
fessor, University of Michigan; sometime member of the faculty Institute on Inter-
national and Comparative Law, University of San Diego.
1. Hague Convention, 1907, War on Land, 36 Stat. 2,2277.
2. It is striking to note that in her book, D. GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW OF BELLGERENT OcCUPATION 1864-1917 (1949), she does not mention the
existence of any monetary problem during this period.
3. See A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 493-
95 (1950); F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 506-07 (3d ed. 1971).
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unanimous condemnation as internationally unlawful.4 Today,
money and more generally monetary measures have become
widespread and an extremely efficient means of total warfare.
Belligerent occupants have all made extensive use of currency in
the territories they occupied during World War II and, to a lesser
degree, during World War I. This paper discusses the legal as-
pects of this new area of international law.
Currency and Belligerent Occupation
If the issuance and regulation of currency in occupied territory
by the occupying power cannot be termed an entirely new phe-
nomenon, however, the generalization, new purposes and dura-
tion of these monetary experiences during the two world wars
have given birth to a series of complex and basic problems arising
at the end of the hostilities and yet to be solved.
The recent developments in wartime monetary experiences
Before 1914
Before World War I, if we brush aside the frequent uses of
counterfeiting enemy currency, very few and inconclusive exam-
ples of monetary manipulations by belligerent occupants may be
gathered.5 As far back as the year 1123 during the siege of Tyre,
the Doge of Venice is reported to have paid his troops a money of
necessity, a leather money, with a solemn promise to redeem it at
face value. Much later on, Frederic H is said to have adopted the
same technique when he besieged Milan.6 At the turn of the 19th
century, the Turks in Greece, the British during the Boer War,
and the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria at the time of the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905 all issued occupation currency, modi-
fying in various degrees the monetary system of the occupied ter-
ritories. Such transactions were not completely unknown in
American history either. During the Revolution, the Continental
Congress issued currency "even before the issuance of the Decla-
ration of Independence" in the territories-it controlled, and the
Confederacy did the same in Confederate territories.7
4. See contra F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 507 (3d ed. 1971).
5. See P. FAUCHLLE, 2 TRArit DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL PuBLIc 267-68 (8th ed.
1921); memorandum prepared by the U.S. Treasury Department, Sept. 23, 1943, re-
produced in Hearings Before the Comm. on Appropriations Armed Services and
Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, on Occupation Currency Transactions, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 72, 72-84 (1947) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Treasury Memo]; V. PE-
TROV, MONEY AND CONQUEST 15 (1967).
6. U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 76-77.
7. Id.
[VOL. 19: 233, 1982] Military Occupation Currency
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
These scattered precedents illustrate clearly the very specific
and limited purposes which the issuance of military currencies
was designed to serve:8 the payment of occupation troops and
purchase of requisitioned goods in the occupied territories.9 Like-
wise, circumscribed, military currency experiences took place
when the British occupied Arkangel, Russia, before and after
World War I;1O when the Americans occupied part of Siberia;"
and when the French occupied the Ruhr in 1923.12 These exper-
iences are exceptional compared to modern practices which
States inaugurated in World War I.
Contemporary experiences
In World War I, drastic and far reaching monetary measures
were imposed by Germany in Belgium, Poland and Rumania and,
to a lesser degree, imposed by Austria in Serbia.13 During World
War II, the Axis powers and the Allies followed suit: Japan modi-
fied the monetary system of Burma, China, Hong Kong, Malaya,
the Philippines and Singapore;14 Germany did the same in the
Baltic States, Belgium, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Rumania, Russia,
Slovakia, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia.15 On the Allied side, mili-
8. This statement, however, might not be accurate with respect to Japanese
"war moneys" in Korea and Manchuria during the 1905 war with Russia. This
rather unique episode seemed to presage the most recent war monetary exper-
iences. See generally U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 77; note 28 infra.
9. PETROV, supra note 5, at 15.
10. U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 77; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, CURRENCIES
AFTER THE WAR 100 (1920).
11. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, CURRENCIES AFTER THE WAR 100 (1920).
12. Id. at 76; G. SCHACHT, THE STABILIZATION OF THE MARK 62 (1927).
13. Fauchille, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 26 R.G.D.LP. 310 (1919); P.
FAUCEILLE, 2 TRArrt DE Dorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 267-68 (1921); Nolde, La mon-
naie en Droit International Public, 27 A.D.L 245, 306-12 (1929) (courses of the
Hague Academy of Int'l Law); Hyde, Concerning the Haw-Pia Case, 24 PHIL. L.J.
141, 147-48 (1949).
14. See generally S. DAs, JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND EX-POST FACTO LEGISLA-
TION IN MALAYA, SINGAPORE (1944); Maung, Enemy Legislation and Judgments in
Burma, 30 J. Comp. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 11, 11-17 (1948) (ser. 3); Perkins, Enemy Legis-
lation in the Liberated Countries: The Philippines, 30 J. CoMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 17
(1948) (ser. 3); O'Connor, Liberated Legislation in Malaya, 33 J. Comp. LEGIS. &
INT'L L. 1 (1951) (ser. 3); Feliciano, The Belligerent Occupant and the Returning
Sovereign: Aspects of the Philippine Law of Be~ligerant Occupation, 28 PHIL. L.J.
645 (1953).
15. See generally R. LEMKIN, AxIs RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944); V. VON
GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERmiTORY (1957); PETROV, supra note 5, at 23-
42.
tary currencies16 were introduced in Austria, Greece, Germany,
Italy and Sicily; yellow seal dollars (spearheads) were used in
French North Africa; supplemental francs were introduced in
France; and British Military Authority notes and pounds were
used in Tripolitania. The Russians17 imposed a military currency
of their own in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania and Germany (where the Russians issued
the same war notes as the Western powers with the special en-
graving plates furnished by the United States).18
The significance of these new experiences
All these experiences are far from being similar, and it is be-
yond the scope of this article to describe them.19 However, de-
spite the fact that they do not follow the same pattern, it is
possible to draw a certain number of common features. First,
these experiences with military occupation currency have in-
volved every important representative country. Secondly, they
have consisted of complete. changes in the monetary systems of
the occupied countries. Thirdly, the general occurrence of these
experiences establish them as a social fact of modern wars. Fi-
nally, the purposes of occupation currencies (and other monetary
reforms) have been greatly expanded by pursuit of numerous
16. See generally Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations Armed
Services and Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, on Occupation Currency Trans-
actions, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Senate Hearings];
PETROV, supra note 5, at 42-51. The combined Chiefs of Staff of the Supreme Al-
lied Commander issued a directive on May 13, 1943 that the task forces use yellow
seal dollars besides regular United States coins and use British Military Authority
(BMA) notes besides regular British coins to supplement lire currency in Sicily.
The Combined Directive for Military Government in Germany, April 28, 1944, di-
rected the Allied force to use yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority
notes if the Reichsmark currency became inadequate. The American Directive on
Military Government of Austria, June 27, 1945, ordered United States forces to use,
for military purposes only, Allied military shillings. For the text of these direc-
tives, see I. HoLBoRN, ArumcAm MmrrARY GovamENr 115-16, 140, 192 (1947).
17. PETROV, supra note 5, at 172-91; U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 53,
122, 135.
18. On this much-debated affair of turning over to-Russia the engraving plates
with which to issue marks in Germany on behalf of the Allies, see U.S. Senate
Hearings, supra note 16, at 7, 14, 16-17, 19, 27, 32, 68, 103-04, 118, 121, 130, 132-33; Pu-
TRov, supra note 5, at 107-32.
19. This is not to say that the practices followed by belligerent occupants in
World War IA Allied as well as enemy powers, have to be placed on an equal foot-
ing. But although the aims differed, the techniques used and occassionally the re-
sults have been close to identical. It is self-evident that there can be no
comparison whatsoever between the Allied and enemy practices, which would be
suggesting that the former are internationally lawful and the latter unlawful. See
U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 82; D. Kemmerer, Allied Military Currency
in Constitutional and International Law. On Money and the Law, Proceedings of
the Institute on Money and the Law 83 (1945).
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goals;2 0 a weapon of total warfare-what a British author de-
scribed as a "good piece of political and economic warfare,"2 1 a
means of assessing the costs of occupation, of securing political
and economic advantages, of punishing the occupied enemy terri-
tory, and sometimes of fostering a social and economic revolution
(in the case of the Russian experiences).22
General problems raised by recent wartime monetary
experiences
A first round of questions is related to the international legality
of the belligerent occupant's actions in the monetary field. Does
the occupant have any monetary powers in the occupied territory;
and if so, what are these powers, and what are their limits, if any?
Secondly, who, at the end of the war, is going to assume the re-
sponsibility for these monetary measures, the former belligerent
occupant or the previously occupied country? Thirdly, the fate of
war notes or other monetary measures enforced by the belliger-
ent occupant also have to be settled after a war. Specifically,
what are the rights and duties, if any, of the returning sovereign?
This raises involved questions of postliminy (or intertemporal)
law. Fourthly, what acknowledgement must be given by the bel-
ligerent occupant of its private debts originating with occupation
currency in the occupied country? In what respect are debtor-
creditor relationships modified after a war, and what are the pos-
sible remedies, if any?
Despite their growing practical as well as theoretical impor-
tance in the law of belligerent occupation, these developments
have received very little attention from writers. No comprehen-
sive study has ever been devoted to the legal aspects of military
occupation currencies.
An Area of the Law of Belligerent Occupation Almost Completely
Neglected by Writers
Many reasons may be put forward to explain this doctrinal gap.
Classical treatises on the law of war or on international law are
generally rather old and have been written before or just after
World War I at a time when few precedents could be relied on to
20. LEMKIN, supra note 15, at 50; PETROV, supra note 5, at 252-53.
21. PETROV, supra note 5, at 44.
22. Id. at 173, 177.
determine and define the monetary powers of a military occu-
pant.23 The temptation then was great for lawyers either to ig-
nore completely what might have appeared as a purely academic
question24 or to conden as internationally unlawful these excep-
tional practices.25
The extensive use of currency devices in occupied territories
during World War H should have led to a thorough study and a
reappraisal of these new developments in the law of belligerent
occupation. But, with few conspicuous exceptions, 2 6 most lawyers
were unable to overcome their traditional uneasiness while deal-
ing with economic, monetary or financial matters and left the field
to economists 27 or political scientists.28 Furthermore, it is fair to
add that the looseness and uncertainty of applicable rules of in-
ternational law in this area hardly constitute a scholarly
incentive.
Currency and the Hague Regulations of 1907
When the laws and customs of land war were codified at The
23. Id.; Nolde, supra note 13, at 306.
24. The classical international law treatises of Hall, Westlake, and Wheaton
are silent on this problem. Likewise, the landmark books on the law of war, such
as PILLET, LES Lois AcTuELLEs DE LA GUERRE, (2d ed. 1901) and J.M. SPAIGHT,
WAR RIGHTS ON LAND (1911), do not mention this issue. The noteworthy exception
is FAUCHILLE, supra note 5, at 267-68.
25. See e.g., C. HYDE, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAw 1897 (2d ed. 1945). But see
FAUCHiLLE, supra note 5, at 267, who seems to be the first leading author to have
dealt, although not very extensively, with the monetary aspects of the law of bel-
ligerent occupations and to have noticed that participants in modern wars had rec-
ognized the right of the occupying power to modify the monetary system of the
occupied country.
26. Here again the modern treatises of international law appear tremendously
inadequate: Cavare, Guggenheim and O'Connell ignore the problem. Oppenheim
devotes one footnote only to the monetary powers of the belligerent occupant L.
OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw 437-38 n.4 (7th ed. Lauterparht 1948). The first
articulate (although not exhaustive) study was given by ERNST H. FEiCHENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELIGERENT OCCUPATION 70-83 (1942). Short
but interesting surveys of the monetary aspects of the law of belligerent occupa-
tion may be found in NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 495-501; F. MANN, THE LEGAL As-
PECT OF MONEY 507-15 (3d ed. 1971). Much valuable information can be gathered
from Nolde, supra note 13, at 306-12; U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 72-94
(the careful study made in 1943 by the General Counsel of the Treasury Depart-
ment, Randolph Paul); A. McNAIR & A. WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 391-92
(1966); Feliciano, supra note 14; Fraleigh, The Validity of Acts of Enemy Occupa-
tion Authorities Affecting Property Rights, 35 CORNELL LQ. 89 (1950); Hyde, Con-
cerning the Haw-Pia Case, 24 PHIL. L.J. 141 (1949) (a controversial note);
KEMMERER, supra note 19, at 83-92. See also note 14 supra.
27. R. LESTER, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF WARTIME MONETARY EXPERIENCES
(1944); F. SOUTHARD, THE FINANE s OF EUROPEAN LIBERATION (1946); SPAHR, AL-
LIED MILITARY CURRENCY (1943).
28. C. FRIEDRICH, AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WORLD
WAR II (1948); H. HoLBoRN, AMERICAN MILITARY GOvERNMENT (1947); LEMEIN,
supra note 15; PETROV, supra note 5; VON GLAHN, supra note 15.
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Hague at the beginning of this century, section El of article 42-56
was dedicated to the "Military Authority over the Territory of the
Hostile State."29 These customary rules of law of belligerent oc-
cupation have never been changed since then, despite their obvi-
ous incompleteness and what has been described as their
obsolescence. Nevertheless, their present usefulness cannot be
questioned as an invaluable starting point for any legal construc-
tion and reflection regarding belligerent occupation problems.
The shortcomings of the Hague Regulations
The Hague Regulations reflect (but who would wonder?) a 19th
century philosophical and economic background which is obvi-
ously no longer in line with contemporary conceptions of war and
economics nor with the broad transformations of the international
society.30 Also, the Hague Regulations concerning belligerent oc-
cupation are certainly incomplete. Although 12 out of 16 articles
of section III discuss economic matters, they do not even mention
monetary concerns. The words "currency," "money," "central
banks," and "gold" never appear in the text.
It goes without saying that a redrafting of the Convention on
the law of belligerent occupation should include provisions deal-
ing with monetary matters; but as a Singapore court pointed out,
"[The Hague] Convention is not exhaustive.... [I]t cannot be
said that anything not expressly authorized is forbidden, by impli-
cation."3 1 This reasonable principle of interpretation and con-
struction greatly diminishes the weight of numerous criticisms
which have described the Hague Regulations as "archaic, '32 "very
scant in extent and very superficial in character," 33 "vague and al-
most meaningless generalities," 34 and obsolete because fre-
quently transgressed.3 5 However appealing and impressive these
sweeping judgments might be, they represent a simplified over-
29. Hague Convention, note I supra.
30. For an excellent analysis and appraisal of the impact of these changes, see
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 10-29.
31. Public Trustee v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 23 LLR.
687, 693 (Org. Civ. Jur., Singapore, 1956) [hereinafter cited as the Public Trustee
case].
32. Smith, The Government of Occupied Territory, 21 B.Y.I.L. 151 (1944).
33. Colby, Occupation Under the Laws of War, 25 COLum. L. REV. 904, 917
(1925).
34. Feliciano, supra note 14, at 669.
35. PETROV, supra note 5, at 82-83.
statement of reality. The Hague Regulations are still useful in
many respects.
The present usefulness of the Hague Regulations
The value of the Hague Regulations derives from their very
existence. Without them, there would be no law of belligerent oc-
cupation whatsoever, and the powers of the military occupant
would be unrestrained, which is clearly unacceptable. Moreover,
these customary rules have never been formally denounced by
belligerents.3 6 Their frequent violation in modern wars does not
imply that they have been actually repudiated; they are still ap-
plied by national as well as international tribunals as the test of
international legality of warfare acts. It is the opinion of this
writer that in spite of their gaps which would be desirable to fill,
the Hague Regulations can still be very helpful in areas of the law
of belligerent occupation (such as the monetary field) which the
Regulations do not expressly cover. As a matter of fact, the ex-
press, broad and flexible rules can be easily adapted to new cir-
cumstances3 7 of modern wars and constitute invaluable guide-
posts which need only to be completed, interpreted and devel-
oped in the light of subsequent States' practices. The crux of the
matter appears to be a mere question of legal construction and
reasoning.
The Expounding of the Hague Regulations
Besides the Hague Regulations which provide for the basic cus-
tomary rules of international law, other sources of applicable law
concerning monetary powers of a belligerent occupant have to be
found in miscellaneous international agreements, national court
decisions, States' practices, and the opinions of leading authori-
ties on international law.38
The relevant international agreements to be taken into account
consist mainly of peace treaties,3 9 armistice conventions,40 and
36. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 5.
37. In this sense, see also Feliciano, supra note 14, at 670.
38. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 5.
39. Curiously enough, none of the peace treaties concluded after World War I
contain any specific provision dealing with occupation currencies, although this
problem was studied by a commission appointed "to inquire and to report upon
the violations of international law committed by Germany." Hyde, supra note 13,
at 147. One of the 32 hearings retained was "Debasement of the Currency, and Is-
sue of Spurious Currency." Id. at 147 n.11. But a different practice was followed
after World War II. See e.g., Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 28,
para. 1(b), 41 U.N.T.S. 21; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 32, para.
4, 41 U.N.T.S. 135; Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 76, para. 4, 49
U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty of Peace with Rounania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 30, para. 4,42 U.N.T.S.
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various agreements regarding either reparations 4 1 or other
financial matters.42 These conventions which deal exclusively
with questions of responsibility and leave aside all problems of le-
gality have to be used carefully, for they represent the political
views of the victorious States imposing their will on the defeated
side, rather than the present state of development of international
law.43
Decisions of national courts of the returning sovereign, and of
the former belligerent as well, contain an invaluable source of in-
formation and constitute certainly the primary source of law in
this field. However, two reservations are to be made: these deci-
sions are not always consistent, 44 and they may only reflect the
purely national interest of the States involved. States' practices
in recent wars have to be scrutinized, if not heavily relied upon.
Field manuals of war departments and armies (although often
sketchy), directives sent to army commanders in occupied coun-
tries, and, more generally, policy followed by States with regard
to the currency management of the occupied countries have to be
carefully considered in order to determine the common rules
which seem generally accepted and respected. Finally, the opin-
ions of leading writers have to be considered, due consideration
being given to the schools of interpretation to which they
belong.45
3; Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14, para. a, 136 U.N.T.S. 45; State
Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent Austria, May 15, 1955, art. 24,
para. 4, 217 U.N.T.S. 223. See also notes 191-201 and accompanying text infra.
40. See Armistice Convention of September 29, 1943, cl. 23, DEP'T STATE Pub.
No. 2669 (European Series 17). See also Quadripartite Agreement for Control of
Germany by Allied Representatives, Sept. 20, 1945, in 3 TREATIES AND OTHER IN-
TERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1949-1976, at 1254-58
(C. Bevans ed. 1969).
41. See the Convention of Nov. 10, 1928 between Roumania and Germany.
Martens Nouveau Recueil 484 (3d ser. (21)); the Agreement between Germany
and Belgium Regarding the Marks, Jul. 13, 1929, 104 LN.T.S. 202; Final Act and An-
nex of the Paris Conference on Reparation, Nov. 9 - Dec. 21, 1945, art. 2, para. A in 8
DocUMENTs ON AmERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945-46, at 227, 230 (R. Dennet & R.
Turner eds. 1976) [World Peace Foundation].
42. See Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, art. 5, para. 2, 333
U.N.T.S. 3, which excludes expressly all governmental claims and the costs of Ger-
man occupation until a final general settlement. See also the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the U.S. and Italy Regarding Settlement of Certain Wartime
Claims and Related Matters, Aug. 14, 1947, 17 DEP'T STATE BULL. 372 (1947).
43. See Feliciano, supra note 14, at 698-99; MANN, supra note 3, at 513; NUSS-
BAUM, supra note 3, at 494-500.
44. McNAm & WATrs, supra note 26, at 392.
45. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 15-17, who correctly emphasizes that
Thus, this article will be an attempt to outline the present posi-
tive rules of law concerning wartime, international, monetary ex-
periences in occupied countries and their aftermath. It will be a
"lex lata" and not a "deferenda" approach. Three main problems
will be investigated: 1) the foundation of monetary powers of the
military occupant, 2) the scope of monetary powers of the military
occupant, and 3) the post-war impact of monetary measures
adopted by the military occupant.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF MONETARY POWERS OF THE MILITARY
OCCUPANT
It would be highly unrealistic and very likely incorrect as well
to construe the relevant customary rules of international law as
condemning what is now universally practiced by States, gener-
ally accepted by leading authors, and widely recognized by na-
tional courts: namely, that belligerent occupants possess
monetary powers in the territories they occupy.4 6 This is not to
say that everything practiced by States was lawful,47 which would
be a comment without any value and interest, but rather that they
had the power to act, leaving aside at this stage of the study the
problems connected with the exercise of this monetary power.
Affirmation By the Universal Practice of States in Modern Wars
The great variety of wartime monetary experiences in occupied
countries reveals some common techniques followed by States
which, it is worth noting, justified their actions with identical
rules of international law.
[c]ountries which had been or expected to be occupants, such as Ger-
many, were inclined to favor comparatively extensive interpretation of the
powers of occupants, [while] [c]ountries which had suffered from occupa-
tion, such as Belgium and France, favored strict interpretations and a nar-
rowing down of powers of occupants. Countries which were friends or
allies of past or prospective victims, but were not afraid of occupation for
their own territories and had themselves engaged in occupations, such as
England and the United States, were inclined to adopt in-between
positions.
Id. at 15.
46. This point appears clearly from the U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at
79.
47. Another danger would be to suggest that all that has been done on the Al-
lied side was internationally lawful, while the corresponding actions undertaken
by the enemy powers were internationally unlawful. This is the main criticism
which might be addressed to Lemkin, who, lightheartedly and indiscriminately,
condemns as a whole the Nazi monetary experiences in Europe. See LEMKm,
supra note 15, at 50-63.
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The common monetary techniques used by belligerent
occupants
With respect to currency (in particular, monetary units), occu-
pying powers pursued three different courses, sometimes com-
bined. First, on rare occasion because it was not always possible,
the military occupant used the existing currency of the occupied
country.48 In such cases, the expenses caused by the presence of
foreign troops and other military requirements resulted in an un-
avoidable increase of currency in circulation and inflationary
pressures. Another possible course for the occupant was the use
of its own currency.49 Although not infrequent in the past, this
method was not followed in World War II for any extended period
of time because of the strains of currency claims and the inflation-
ary dangers which the method imposed on the occupant's mone-
tary system.
The last and by far the most frequent system to date consisted
of issuing a new currency having legal tender and replacing or cir-
culating together with the previous monetary unit in the occupied
country.0 The use of such war notes was extremely convenient
48. During World War I, Germany in Northern France and the United States
in Rhineland used this technique. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 495-96. The
same writer adds that "in World War II the money supply for the occupation of
territories of Allied Powers was secured through arrangements with the Allied
Governments concerned." Id. at 496 n.26. More particularly, on the frictions be-
tween France and its Allies as to the issuance of "supplemental francs" and the
Eisenhower-Koenig Agreement of Aug. 25, 1944, see PETROV, supra note 5, at 56-62.
Feilchenfeld places under the same heading the German practice in Belgium dur-
ing World War I, but the facts of this case do not suggest such a classification. By
vesting the privilege of issuing a new currency in Belgium in a private bank (the
Socidt6 Gen~rale de Belgique) instead of the Belgium National Bank, which had
taken away all its printing plates and monetary assets, the German occupants
were actually introducing indirectly a brand new monetary unit. See Nolde, supra
note 13, at 306-11; MANN, supra note 3, at 507-08.
49. This was the general practice followed by Austria-Hungary in World War L
See NusSBAUM, supra note 3, at 497 n.29; FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 76-80.
During the first phase of the Second World War while occupying North Africa,
American troops provisionally used spearhead currencies or regular silver certifi-
cates bearing a yellow seal, in contrast to the blue seal printed on silver certifi-
cates in the United States. Likewise, the German army in occupied areas
introduced "Reichskreditkassenscheine," denominated in Reichsmarks which
were progressively withdrawn by the end of 1943. See LE=MIN, supra note 15, at 51;
PETROV, supra note 5, at 23-41 (particularly P.35). In Jersey, Germany introduced
the regular German notes, which was highly exceptional. See Duret Aubin, Enemy
Legislation and Judgments in Jersey, 31 J. Cohip. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 8 (1949).
50. This technique was followed by Germany in World War I during its occu-
pation of Belgium, Rumania, and a small part of Italy. See FErLCHENFELD, supra
to meet the day-to-day monetary needs of an occupation army
without impairing too much the economic life in the occupied ter-
ritory. Furthermore, this system avoided commitments as to the
distribution of occupation costs between Allied and enemy pow-
ers and postponed the solution of these financial questions until a
definitive peace treaty settlement.51 But these advantages re-
mained only as long as military currencies were properly man-
aged and operated by occupying powers, which was far from
being the general rule. These war monies bore with them many
dangers for the belligerent occupant, the greatest of which was
the ruination of the occupied country through the complete col-
lapse of its monetary system. From the viewpoint of international
legality, this scheme was certainly the most questionable of all.
If the belligerent occupant chose to utilize its own currency or
to introduce a new one from scratch, it was faced with valuation
problems in the sense that it would have to fix an exchange rate
between the different circulating media.52 During World War II,
all of the belligerent occupants exercised this valuation power,
even though sometimes unscrupulously.5 3
Among other common practices, occupying powers have always
been eager to seize "State treasures," like state-owned gold (or
monetary gold), funds, foreign exchange and generally all mone-
tary assets in order to finance their war operations. 54 Also, tradi-
tionally, belligerent occupants have carefully regulated inflows
and outflows of funds from territories they occupied through the
complex machinery of exchange control systems.55 Finally, bellig-
erent occupants have promoted many other types of monetary re-
forms in the occupied countries. Reforms varied from drastic and
complete reorganization of the whole monetary system5 6 to the
modification of the banking institution (mainly central banks)57
note 26, at 80-81, Nolde, supra note 13, at 306-12. In World War II, Allied as well as
enemy powers introduced occupation currencies in the territories they occupied.
See references cited in notes 14-17 supra.
51. This point was emphasized by the U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 83.
52. See FEICHENFELD, supra note 26, at 80-82; VON GLAHN, mupra note 15, at
203.
53. See notes 168-78 and accompanying text infra.
54. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 71; LEMKiN, supra note 15 at 57-58; VON
GLAHN, supra note 15, at 204. See also the Directive to the Commander in Chief of
the U.S. Forces of Occupation on July 11, 1947, as reproduced in W. BISHOP, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 989 (3d ed. 1971). See also notes 144-48 and accompanying text
infra.
55. LEMum, supra note 15, at 56-57; VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 203-04. See
also notes 142-43 and accompanying text infra.
56. See e.g., the German practice in the so-called "incorporated areas,"
LEwNIN, supra note 15, at 52, or the monetary reform imposed by the Western Al-
lies in Germany in 1948, PETROV, supra note 5, at 236-51.
57. For the German practice in World War I in Belgium, see FsiLcHENF=LD,
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or the mere liquidation of hostile banks and other enemy financial
businesses and monetary assets.5 8
Common justification
States have always affirmed that they were acting within the
recognized powers of military occupants by the "principles of the
law of nations as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of
public conscience," 59 quoting the preamble of the 1907 Hague Reg-
ulations. More specifically, States have invoked and relied upon
section three of Convention IV of the Hague Regulations, dealing
with belligerent occupation.60 Such a contention has never been
seriously challenged either by the majority of writers or by na-
tional courts' decisions.
General Acceptance by Writers
However greatly doctrine and practice differ as to the exercise
of monetary powers of belligerent occupants, they concur with re-
gard to the source or basis of these powers. Fauchille was proba-
bly the first prominent writer to acknowledge the existence of
these powers.6 1 Oppenheim, although reluctantly, admits that
"conditions may compel the occupant to issue regulations con-
cerning currency .... ,62 Fitzmaurice recognizes that "under the
conditions of modern warfare, the issue of occupation currency by
a belligerent occupant for the use of its troops is a practical ne-
cessity and is justified .... -63 Likewise, Lord McNair writes that
"so long as [the introduction of a new currency by the military oc-
cupant] can be justified as being in exercise of the legitimate
powers of a belligerent occupant, the practice is not unlaw-
ful ... -64 For Nussbaum, "[t]he power to issue currency forms
supra note 26, at 71-76, 96-104. For practices in almost every occupied country in
World War II, see LE mIN, supra note 15, at 54-55; VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at
205.
58. On the Japanese actions, see DAs, supra note 14, at 100.
59. Hague Convention, note 1 supra.
60. See U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 72-84; DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
[United States], THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 157, para. 430 (1956) (FM27-10) [here-
inafter cited as Army Field Manual].
61. See note 25 supra.
62. OPPENHE M, supra note 26, at 437-48 n.4.
63. Fitzmaurice, The Juridical Clauses of Peace Treaties, 73 A.D.L 259, 342
(1948) (courses of the Hague Academy of Int'l Law).
64. McNAiR & WATTS, supra note 26, at 391.
part of the occupant's vicarious sovereignty rights."65 According
to Professor Mann, "the introduction of a new currency cannot be
considered as unlawful."66 Generally, Feilchenfeld states that
"[t]he powers of occupants in regard to money and currency are
based on the occupant's general power to maintain law and order.
This may be effected by several methods, varying according to cir-
cumstances and policy."67 And in their previously mentioned
studies, Das, Feliciano, Fraleigh, Hyde, and Kemmerer all take for
granted the existence of monetary powers vested in the belliger-
ent occupant.
In short, writers have not questioned the validity of war notes
or occupation currencies, and no significant condemnation of this
universal and necessary practice has ever been written. The
same conclusion can be drawn from the score of national courts'
decisions available.
General Recognition by National Courts
The trend in judicial decisions rendered by courts of the re-
turning sovereign or the former belligerent occupant is reason-
ably clear: American,68 Burmese, 6 9 German, 70 Italian,7 1
Malayan, 72 Filipino,73 Polish,74 and Singapore7 5 tribunals have ac-
cepted (to use the broad words of the United States Court of
Claims) the general principle that "the task of occupying powers
... certainly ... include[s] the power to establish a rational
monetary system."76 Furthermore, even when some national
65. NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 498.
66. MANN, supra note 3, at 509.
67. F ILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 70.
68. Aboitz and Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602, 18 LL.RL 592 (D. Utah 1951); Eisner
v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 197, 21 LL.R. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
69. U Hoke Wan v. Maung Ba San, 14 ANN. DiG. 235 (High Court, Burma, 1947);
Taik v. Ariff Moosa Jee Dooply, 15 ANN. DIG. 576 (High Court, Burma, 1948).
70. RGZ 103, 231 (Reichsgericht, Nov. 28, 1921); JW 1922, 1324 (Reichsgericht,
April 22, 1922); RGZ 109, 357 (Reichsgericht, Dec. 20, 1924).
71. See digest of Nicolo v. Creni, 19 LL.R. 145 (Court of Cassation, Italy, 1952).
72. Planters Loans Board v. Managalam, 18 LL.R. 585 (High Court, Malaya,
1951).
73. See the leading case, Haw-Pia v. The China Banking Corp., 18 LIR. 642
(Sup. Ct. Phil. 1948), confirmed by a long line of decisions by the Philippines
Supreme Court in Gibbs v. Rodriguez, 18 LLR. 661 (Sup. Ct. Phil. 1950); Hilado v.
de la Costa, decision of April 30, 1949, as summarized in 44 AM. J. INT'L I. 211-12
(1950); and by the Philippines Court of Appeals in Madlambayan v. Aquino, 22
I.L.R. 994 (Ct. App. Phil. 1954); Singson v. Veloso, 23 LI.R. 800 (Ct. App., Phil.
1955).
74. Wladislaw F. v. Mebli, 26 LL.R. 719 (Sup. Ct. PoL, 1947). See also the cases
cited in the note folloving the Wladislaw opinion, 26 LLR 721 (1947).
75. Public Trustee case, supra note 31, at 687.
76. Eisner v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 197, 199, 21 LLR. 476, 477 (Ct. CL
1954).
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courts in Belgium7 7 and Poland78 after World War I and Hong
Kong7 9 and Luxemburg8O after World War II have refused to up-
hold (usually on very unclear grounds) the validity of monetary
measures imposed by Germany and Japan, respectively, these
courts have not denied the possible existence of a belligerent oc-
cupant's monetary power.
Only one and perhaps two decisions by the Burma High Court
have formally and explicitly refused to admit that the military oc-
cupant was acting within its authority under international law in
effecting changes in the currency system of the occupied country.
In Ko Maung Tin v. U Gon Man,81 the Burmese judges described
the Japanese war notes as "mere scraps of paper devoid of all
barter value."82 In Dooply v. Chan Taik,83 the Burma Supreme
Court followed the same line and stated that the Japanese mili-
tary notes were "no better than tokens" and reaffirmed that they
"never formed part of the currency system in Burma and were
not money."84 In this author's opinion, Feliciano is right in criti-
cizing this decision as "distinctly unrealistic."85 This lone case is
not enough to cast doubt on the soundness of the aforementioned
views of the almost unanimous, national courts, recognizing the
existence of monetary powers of belligerent occupants.
The International Law Foundation of Belligerent Occupants'
Monetary Powers
The primary source of monetary powers of the belligerent occu-
pant is traditionally ferreted out from the law of belligerent occu-
pation expressed in the Hague Regulations of 1907. A secondary,
although rarely mentioned,86 source of these powers may be
educed from certain fundamental principles of law of money.
77. Pasicrisie belge 1923-1-269 (Ct. of Cassation, Belgium, April 16, 1923).
78. JW 1922, 1689 (Sup. Ct., PoL, Aug. 28, 1919).
79. Tse Chung v. Lee Yau Chu, 18 LL.R. 636 (Sup. Ct., Hong Kong, 1951).
80. G. v. H., 18 IJ.R. 633 (Dist. Ct., Luxembourg, 1951).
81. 14 AN. DIG. 233 (High Court, Burma, 1947).
82. Id. at 235.
83. 19 LL.R. 619 (Sup. Ct., Burma, 1950).
84. Id. at 620.
85. Feliciano, supra note 14, at 677.
86. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 498. But see MANN, supra note 3, at
508 (who denies that any principle of the law of money is relevant).
The primary source: the law of belligerent occupation
It is a well accepted principle that the Hague Regulations con-
stitute the "measure of international legality,"87 the one objective
test88 by which acts of belligerent occupants have to be appraised.
In this respect, article 43 of Convention IV is the crux of the prob-
lem, providing that "[t]he authority of the legitimate power hav-
ing in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall
take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety... ."89 From this general power
and specific duty of maintaining public order and safety under ar-
ticle 43, it has been generally deduced by courts, and writers as
well, that belligerent occupants had the right to "provide for and
regulate matters of currency and banking so that the population
could live orderly lives."90 In other words, military occupants are
entitled and even compelled to use their monetary powers in the
occupied country to the extent necessary to "keep the economic
life of the community going." 91 In so doing, military occupants
are acting in the primary interest of the inhabitants whose coun-
try they occupy.92
But monetary powers of belligerent occupants may also be
based upon a more selfish foundation. It is widely recognized that
military necessity can be used as a proper basis. According to
Hall, "rights of occupation may be placed upon the broad founda-
tion of simple military necessity,"9 3 and this notion underlies sec-
tion III of the Hague Regulations. As a matter of fact, the already
long history, the widespread use of war monies or occupation cur-
rencies, and the acceptance of this foundation by most national
courts have proved Hall right.94 In short, the military necessity
which is behind this much debated section III of the Hague Regu-
lations and, more particularly, the maintenance of law and order
mentioned in article 43 have generally been deemed a sufficient
basis for the exercise of monetary powers vested in belligerent
87. Aboitz and Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602, 623, 18 L.R. 592, 603 (D. Utah
1951).
88. However, this character of objectivity might be disputed in light of the
above-mentioned contradictory decisions handed down by some Belgian, Burmese
and Polish courts. See cases cited in notes 78-80 supra.
89. Hague Convention, art. 43, supra note 1, at 2307.
90. Public Trustee case, supra note 31, at 694.
91. Aboitz and Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602, 613, 18 LLR. 592, 600 (D. Utah
1951).
92. This was expressly mentioned in the decisions of the Reichsgericht, supra
note 70.
93. W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 559 (8th ed. 1924).
94. Military necessity is also relied on in the Public Trustee case, supra note
31; Haw-Pia v. The China Banking Corp., 18 LL.R. 642 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1948) and
Gibbs v. Rodriguez, 18 LLR. 661 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1950).
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occupants. The law of money does not command a different
conclusion.
A possible secondary source: the law of money
It is often said that money is an attribute of sovereignty in the
sense that States, within the territory they control,95 have the in-
herent right to coin money and regulate its value;9 6 most of the
time, they are sovereign entities so that the power to issue a cur-
rency coincides with the possession of State sovereignty. But a
disassociation between the two notions may not disturb a State's
power to issue currency as long as the critical element does not
consist of "State sovereignty" but rather of actual supremacy, the
exercise of unchallenged supreme powers over a certain territory.
It is a well known phenomenon that insurgents have validly is-
sued currency in the territory they dominated and that this power
has been recognized by courts.97 For instance, in the landmark
case, Thorington v. Smith,98 the United States Supreme Court
dealt with the problem of confederacy notes issued during the
Civil War in the Confederate territory and upheld the issuance of
Confederate currency. The Court, while regarding those notes "as
a currency, imposed on the community by irresistible force,"
pointed out the fundamental principle that
it seems to follow as a necessary consequence from this actual supremacy
of the insurgent government, as a belligerent, within the territory where it
circulates, and from the necessity of civil obedience on the part of all who
remained in it, that this currency must be considered in courts of law in
the same light as if it has been issued by a foreign governmen tempora-
rily occupying a part of the territory of the United States (emphasis
added). 99
The obvious analogy in this respect between insurgency and
belligerent occupation and "the defacto government character of
the occupation authorities"100 is enough to justify the monetary
powers of belligerent occupants. However, no court decision has
ever relied on this ground.
95. See generally Mann, Money in Public International Law, 96 A.D.L 75 (1959)
(courses of the Hague Academy of Int'l Law).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
97. See U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 76-77, 79; NusSBAUM, supra note
3, at 6-7, 592-94; MAN, supra note 3, at 19.
98. Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 8 (1868).
99. Id. at 11-12.
100. NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 498.
Summary
In brief, the existence of monetary powers of belligerent occu-
pants and their general basis on well accepted rules of interna-
tional law are unquestionable and have never been seriously
challenged. But beyond this point, the greatest uncertainty re-
mains in connection with the scope of the monetary powers of the
belligerent occupant. There are many more questions than defini-
tive answers concerning this next issue.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE MONETARY POWERS OF THE BELIGERENT
OCCUPANT
The rights and duties of belligerent occupants with regard to
the monetary system of the occupied country have to be ap-
praised according to a test of validity as determined by interna-
tional law and interpreted in the light of economic consideration.
The Test of Validity According to International Law
The guiding principles in administering this test are to be in-
ferred from the Hague Regulations of 1907, concerning belligerent
occupation. The basic idea of such a test is that belligerent occu-
pation, by its very nature, imposes certain broad obligations upon
occupants which limit their exercise of monetary powers.
The very nature of belligerent occupation
It was not before the middle of the 18th century that the basis
of modern theory of belligerent occupation emerged. Until then,
the prevailing doctrine accepted the idea of a temporary and
quasi-unbound substitution of sovereignty analogous to conquest
or annexation of the territory concerned.10 ' Since then, it has be-
come a well accepted principle that military occupation, being
"essentially provisional," 0 2 does not constitute a transfer or dis-
placement of sovereignty although the legitimate sovereign is un-
able to exercise its rights during the period of occupation. 103 As a
Singapore court noted, "[t]he position of a belligerent State occu-
pying enemy territory during a war differs from that of a state ex-
ercising sovereignty in its own territory."10 4 The occupying State
can be regarded only as "administrator and usufructuary" in the
101. See SPAIGHT, .supra note 24, at 321-22, 329; FAUCHILLE, supra note 5, at 215-
18; WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW - WAR 95-96 (1910); WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 231, 233-34 (7th ed. A. Keith ed. 1944). HALL, supra note 93, at 555-58.
102. HYDE, supra note 25, at 1898.
103. McNAm & WATrS, supra note 26, at 369.
104. Public Trustee case, supra note 31, at 687, 692.
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territory it occupies, to use the words of article 55 of the Hague
Regulations.105 International law grants belligerent occupants
fewer rights in extension and character than those ordinarily
vested in legitimate governments and, accordingly, prescribes a
general code of conduct which mandates broad goals for belliger-
ent occupation while permitting a choice of means.
The general obligations of belligerent occupants
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupant
"shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure as
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." 0 6 Other
provisions stipulate that the occupant cannot confiscate private
property'0 7 or levy money contributions beyond the needs of the
army or of the administration of the occupied territory.108 Gen-
eral and unlimited contributions are forbidden;10 9 likewise,
"[r] equisitions in kind and services" shall not be demanded from
the population except for military needs and shall be proportion-
ate to the resources of the country."0 If we keep in mind the
transient character of belligerent occupation and the vicarious
powers of the occupant, it is possible to draw from these provisos
a certain number of unquestionable principles which are protec-
tive of the interest of the occupied country and its inhabitants,
while not interfering with the military effort of the occupant.
First, as a Singapore court stated, a belligerent occupant may
not be "required to enforce or administer [the local laws in force,
which] would be impracticable.""' A belligerent occupant must,
however, abstain from promoting measures aimed at fundamen-
tal, social or economic changes in the established order
equivalent to a revolution." 2 Secondly, a belligerent occupant
105. Hague Convention, art. 55, supra note 1, at 2309.
106. Id. art. 43 at 2306.
107. Id. art. 46 at 2306.
108. Id. art. 49 at 2307.
109. Id. art. 51 at 2307.
110. Id. art. 53 at 2308.
111. Public Trustee case, supra note 31, at 693.
112. Pillet states that the occupant's domination is, by nature, "limited and con-
servative" in PLET, LES Lois ACTUELLES DE LA GUERRE 242-43 (2d ed. 1901). Fitz-
maurice remarks that there is a "fundamental obligation of an occupying
belligerent not to effect fundamental alterations in the general constitutional and
administrative, and probably also the financial system of the occupied territory."
Fitzmaurice, supra note 63, at 342.
must not deliberately deprive inhabitants of their property, either
directly or indirectly, through the introduction of social or eco-
nomic legislation or the imposition of exorbitant requisition or
unreasonable money contributions.113 Thirdly, a belligerent occu-
pant must avoid any unjust or undue enrichment to the detriment
of the occupied country.114 Finally, the occupant must abstain
from driving the occupied country to economic ruination by strip-
ping it of its wealth."15
Obviously, these broad rules imposing restrictions on the bellig-
erent occupant are not easily enforceable, particularly in the
monetary field, because of their looseness and abstraction. But,
when properly qualified by economic considerations, they seem
flexible enough to have practical application.
The Monetary Powers of the Military Occupant and the
Economics of Belligerent Occupation
While evaluating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any mone-
tary measure adopted by a belligerent occupant, it is necessary to
consider the State's management of money in peacetime and the
particular economic conditions initially prevailing in the occupied
territory.
Management of currency by States in peacetime"16
Currency manipulation, stringent exchange control regulations,
nationalization of central banks and other financial institutions,
freezes of foreign and monetary assets, prohibition of gold and
other monetary clauses in private contracts, and compulsory sur-
render of privately-owned gold or foreign exchange are all well-
known techniques for managing currency in present times, al-
though universally condemned sixty years ago. The same can be
said of inflation. Because of fundamental changes in thoughts
and conditions, what appeared unacceptable and unlawful before
World War I is now generally accepted as lawful, if not actually
recommended by some theoreticians. A similar lowering of mone-
tary standards for belligerent occupation must correspond to this
lowering of peacetime standards. A belligerent occupant can
never be expected to behave as the legitimate sovereign and, a
113. SPAIGT, supra note 24, at 384-85; KEMMERER, supra note 19, at 88; LEIN,
supra note 15, at 50, 53.
114. LEMnKN, supra note 15, at 53; MAIN, supra note 3, at 513-14; FEILCHENFELD,
supra note 26, at 14, 41, 47, 82, 92; HYDE, supra note 25, at 1897.
115. LEMKIN, supra note 15, at 50; KEMMERER, supra note 19, at 85;
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 82.
116. For further developments, see the excellent analysis of FEILCHENFELD,
supra note 26, at 17-19.
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fortiori, it would be highly unrealistic to require him to follow
rules of conduct which are not compulsory according to interna-
tional law.
The particular economic conditions prevailing in the
occupied country
The lawfulness of an occupant's monetary measures may be de-
termined, in part, by the prior conduct of the conquered legiti-
mate government or former belligerent occupant. Mitigating
circumstances may include: the removal abroad of printing plates
and monetary cover, as was the case in Belgium in 1919;117 the de-
struction of huge stocks of existing currency, as the British did in
Malaysia in 1941;118 and other currency sabotages1 9 designed to
make the maintenance of public order and safety by the belliger-
ent occupant as difficult as possible. These acts may render law-
ful the belligerent occupant's monetary measures which might
have been deemed unlawful in other circumstances.
Another important factor is the purpose behind the monetary
choice of the belligerent occupant, namely, whether or not it in-
tended to exploit the occupied country. In this respect, a rule has
been proposed by Hyde that "[t]he scope of the occupant's right
depends upon the degree of harm wrought to the creditor by the
occupant's decrees.' 20 This proposal is both too tight and incom-
plete in its formulation. It is unavoidable that the occupant's
monetary measures will be harmful to the whole economy of the
occupied country, not only to the creditors. The degree of harm is
a secondary factor compared with the occupant's intent. The em-
phasis should be placed on the actual behavior of the belligerent
occupant, who is only required to choose the least harmful mone-
tary policy compatible with the conduct of the war, its own war-
oriented national economy, and the particular economic structure
of the occupied country (probably also of a war-oriented type).
Finally, psychological elements, mainly confidence, constitute
key factors in understanding monetary mechanisms. In the case
of war currencies, the "fate of arms" or turn of war is enough to
cause a depreciation or an appreciation in the value of the occu-
117.. Id. at 70-76; Nolde, supra note 13, at 306-12.
118. Public Trustee case, supra note 31, at 696.
119. See U.S. Treasury Memo, supra note 5, at 81.
120. Hyde, supra note 13, at 144.
pation currency.
12 1
Thus, economic considerations are introduced into the pondera-
tion over a test for lawful monetary measures during occupation.
International validity of certain measures will be relative to
purely economic factors, which will serve to qualify the applicable
international law. This qualified law gives a more scientific and
objective approach to the determination of the monetary powers
of the belligerent occupant.
The Rights of the Belligerent Occupant Regarding Currency
The rights to issue a new currency and to fix its value, to intro-
duce exchange controls, to seize monetary assets, to modify the
banking system, and to liquidate enemy monetary assets will be
discussed in that order.
The right to issue a new currency
Military occupants may use their own national currency or the
existing currency of the occupied country, introduce a new one
having exclusive legal tender or circulate a new currency together
with the existing national monetary unit. 22 International law rec-
ognizes the lawfulness of each of these techniques, the choice of
which is left to the occupant. Most of the time, however, the tech-
niques are dictated by factual circumstances.123
Whenever possible, intprnational law probably requires the bel-
ligerent occupant to maintain the existing currency as the legal
medium of exchange;124 such a solution also coincides with the in-
terests of the belligerent occupant because in such a case, it will
not be held responsible for the management and redemption of
the currency.125 The whole monetary burden will be borne exclu-
sively by the occupied country which will actually be barred at
the end of the war from submitting a valid and identifiable claim
of indemnification for the unavoidable increase of the currency in
circulation due to the presence of foreign troops. This explains
why governments have usually ordered their retreating armies to
121. Thus, at the beginning of the occupation, the "good" money is the occupa-
tion currency introduced by the seemingly victorious power, but if it appears to be
defeated, the occupation currency rapidly becomes worthless, the victory expec-
tancy and then public confidence having disappeared. This is a new illustration of
Gresham's Law: bad currency drives out good.
122. See generally FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 70-83; MANN, supra note 3, at
507. See also Army Field Manual, supra note 60, at 157.
123. Id.
124. This was the opinion of the Hong Kong Supreme Court in Tse Chung v.
Lee Yau Chu, 18 LL.R. 636 (Sup. Ct., Hong Kong, 1951). However, this cannot be
said to be an absolute rule of international law.
125. See e.g., note 48 supra.
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destroy all available stocks of currency and have taken abroad the
printing plates and monetary assets backing the circulating
notes.1
26
When this first method cannot be applied, it is impossible to say
that international law compels the belligerent occupant to employ
its own currency. National courts have recognized that this would
add too much strain on the economy and the monetary system of
their countries.127 As the High Court of Malaya reasoned, occu-
pants have a duty "of administering the government of the terri-
tory not only in the interest of themselves but also of the
inhabitants so far as consistent with their own safety" (emphasis
added).128 Furthermore, the introduction of new currency would
give rise to valid claims against the occupant and would make it
responsible for the currency's redemption at the end of the war, a
solution which the occupant has every reason to avoid whether
victorious or defeated.12
9
Nevertheless, the issuance of a new currency constitutes proba-
bly the most acceptable provisional solution, while leaving the
question of responsibility to be resolved at the peace conference
table. It is the overwhelming opinion of national courts, 3 0 and
writers,' 3 ' that military occupants can impose occupation curren-
cies having legal tender and thus bring a legal medium of ex-
change. In Haw-Pia v. China Banking Corp.,13 2 the Philippines
Supreme Court recognized that "[t] he power of the military gov-
ernment established in occupied enemy territory to issue military
currency in the exercise of their governmental power has never
been seriously questioned." 3 3 In Aboitz v. Price,3 4 a United
States District Court endorsed this ruling and added that his
power "cannot seriously be questioned."3 5 A conclusion to the
contrary would be in complete contradiction to total economic
126. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 70-83; Nolde, supra note 13, at 306-12.
127. Such hardship was lucidly examined in Haw-Pia v. The China Banking
Corp., 18 I.L.R. 642, 659 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1948).
128. See Planters Loans Board v. Managalam, 18 I.L.R. 585, 588 (High Court, Ma-
laya, 1951).
129. See the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence cited by PETROV, supra note
5, at 58-59; U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 115.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 18 LL.R. 642 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1948).
133. Id. at 657.
134. 99 F. Supp. 602, 18 LLR. 592 (D. Utah 1951).
135. Id. at 613, 18 LL.R. at 600.
warfare as universally practiced by States and is not supported in
international law.
The High Court of Burma concluded that "articles 42 to 56 of
the Hague Regulations of 1907 clearly cannot be invoked in sup-
port of the exercise of the occupying power of effecting a change
in the currency system of the occupied Territory"136 and, accord-
ingly, that the introduction of Japanese military action could not
be deemed necessary for preserving order, peace and good gov-
ernment, thereby failing to pass the test of international law.
This, however, was obiter dictum, a policy decision. As a matter
of fact, it is noteworthy that the Burmese judges were chastized
by their legislature.13
7
The right to fix a rate of exchange
The unequivocal right to issue occupation or war currency nec-
essarily implies the regulation of its value by the establishment of
a rate of exchange. A currency, being a universal medium of ex-
change, has to have a value corresponding to a certain purchasing
power. Thus, one of the very first acts of the occupant, if it in-
troduces a new currency, will be to give the currency a "valua-
tion," a rate of exchange with the former (or concurring) notes in
circulation in the occupied country.13 8 This undisputable right to
fix a rate of exchange for the occupation currency lies at the
center of the controversies with regard to the monetary powers of
belligerent occupants.1
3 9
Valuation involves the following questions: at what level must
this rate be established; does international law require that valua-
tion be pegged at the pre-war rate of exchange prevailing between
the national currencies of the occupied and occupying countries,
and if there were no pre-war rates, what governs; and may the oc-
cupant manipulate the occupation currency (for example, devalu-
136. Ko Maung Tin v. U Gon Man, 14 ANN. DIG. 233, 234-35 (High Court, Burma,
1947). In Dooply v. Chan Taik, 19 ANN. DIG. 619 (Sup. Ct., Burma, 1948), the same
result was reached. However, in Talk v. Ariff Moosa Jee Dooply, 15 ANN. DIG. 576
(High Court, Burma, 1948), the court conceded that "it was within the competence
of the Japanese Military Authorities to issue their own military notes in order to
supplement the lawful currency of the country as a measure to restore and ensure
public order as required of an occupying power by art. 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions." Id. at 581.
137. DAs, supra note 14, at 110; Maung, supra note 14, at 14-15; Feliciano, supra
note 14, at 699-700.
138. FELCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 81-82; VON GLA-N, supra note 15, at 203.
139. Two negative decisions, one by a Burmese Court, Talk v. Ariff Moosa Jee
Dooply, 15 ANN. DIG. 576 (High Court, Burma, 1948), and one by a Luxembourger
Tribunal, G. v. H., 18 LL.R. 633 (Dist. Ct., Luxembourg, 1951), rely expressly on
specific and allegedly improper valuation of the occupation currency. See Kem-
merer, supra note 19, at 88.
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ate or appreciate it)? These valuation problems cannot be
underestimated, for the belligerent occupant has a unique and
easy opportunity to enrich itself, to the point of complete eco-
nomic ruination of the occupied country, by simply imposing an
overvaluated currency by means of an artificial, fictitious rate of
exchange. 140
International law does not prescribe any specific, practical re-
quirement in this field, and it would be unrealistic and arbitrary
to propose one. However, this does not mean that the belligerent
occupant is free to impose any rate of exchange it thinks fit.141
Here again, the limits to its powers have to be deduced from the
broad principle relating to the law of belligerent occupation.
The right to introduce exchange controls
Another well accepted and much less debated power of the bel-
ligerent occupant is the right to introduce exchange control legis-
lation or to tighten the already existing ones "in order to conserve
the monetary assets of the occupied Territory."'142 This restriction
or prohibition of inflow and outflow of funds is part and parcel of
general legislation prohibiting trade with the enemy and enacted
by any belligerent in the territories it controls.143
The right to seize monetary assets
Article 53 of the Hague Regulations admits that the belligerent
occupant can "take possession of cash, funds or realizable securi-
ties which are strictly the property of the State" (emphasis ad-
ded).144 Thus, gold, foreign exchange and other monetary assets
can be legally seized by the occupant to the extent that they are
publicly and not privately owned.145 This general principle seems
140. Hyde, supra note 25, at 1897.
141. Moreover, a belligerent occupant is not compelled under international law
to enforce a unitary rate of exchange. f for instance, it prescribes the inhabitants
of the occupied territory to surrender their old currency and to accept in exchange
a new currency, it may do so by using different rates of conversion according to
the worth or the social value of these monetary claims. Thus, in Eisner v. United
States, 117 F. Supp. 197, 21 LIR. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1954), the United States Court of
Claims, drawing an analogy from the law of bankruptcy, recognized the right of
the Allies in Germany to privilege, labor, and post-occupation claims over pre-oc-
cupation and Reichmarks claims. Id. at 199, 21 LL.R. at 477.
142. Army Field Manual, supra note 60, at 157.
143. VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 203-04; LEmim, supra note 15, at 56-57.
144. Hague Convention, note 1 supra.
145. LEKIm, supra note 15, at 57-78; Feilchenfeld, supra note 26, at 52-53, 58-60.
to be reasonably clear, but in fact, it has very often proved diffi-
cult to apply due to lack of definition.
For instance, how should one define "monetary gold belonging"
to the occupied country? 4 6 Does this mean gold in the form of
coins, bars or ingots, used as cover for a note issue which is recog-
nized legal tender; or gold whose legal ownership is vested in a
government or State instrumentality; or gold which in the eco-
nomic and functional sense is a part of a country's monetary re-
serve? It seems preferable and more realistic to adopt this last
functional approach, as does G. Sauser-Hall in his arbitration on
"the Gold Looted by Germany from Rome,"' 47 although emphasis
is usually stressed on legalistic aspects. 48
The right to modify the banking system
Modification of the banking system in an occupied country and,
principally, interference with the functioning of central banks
have been controversial. 4 9 For instance, the organization by the
Germans of new central banks in Belgium during World War I
and in most Eastern countries in World War H has been con-
demned due to the fact that these institutions were '"privately
owned and operated."' 5 0 This criticism reflects a 19th century-ori-
ented attitude and attaches too much importance to purely legal
terms.
Here again, it is necessary to make a more sophisticated study
of the public functions filled by central banks in the economic,
financial and monetary fields.15' One cannot but agree with
Feilchenfeld when he writes that "central banks, so far as their
main function is concerned, do hardly anything which, under
modern conditions, concepts and practices, would not be done by
the state itself if central banks did not do it for the state.'
52
Thus, if legal fictions and formalities are disregarded, central
banks have to receive the same less favourable treatment as State
instrumentalities. The unavoidable conclusion appears to be that
146. For a thorough discussion of these problems of definition, see MANN, supra
note 3, at 31, 508; Mann, Money in Public International Law, 96 A.D.L 10 (1959)
(courses of the Hague Academy of Int'l Law).
147. 20 LL.R. 441, 466, 471 (1953). In the same case, see also the decision of Jen-
kins (J.) in Dolifus Mieg & Co. v. Bank of England, 1 Ch. 369 (1949).
148. As mentioned in MANN, supra note 3, at 508 n.3.
149. For an excellent survey, see generally FEIcHENFELD, supra note 26, at 96-
104; VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 205; LEmKIN, supra note 15, at 54-55 (Lemkin
thinks that the interference in the organization and the functioning of Central
Banks by the Germans in World War II represents a violation of international
law.)
150. LEAnuaN, upra note 15, at 57-58.
151. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 103-04.
152. Id. at 104.
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the belligerent occupant has a legal right to reorganize central
banks and regulate the whole credit system and all banking activ-
ities, to the extent, however, that it does not misuse its preroga-
tives.153 These are only ancillary powers based on by the
occupant's fundamental rights to issue an occupation currency
and manage accordingly the new monetary system of the occu-
pied country.
The right to liquidate foreign assets
The right of a belligerent occupant to liquidate all foreign assets
it considers hostile does not arouse the same controversies. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines in the famous Haw-Pia case
recognized the right of the Japanese military occupants to seques-
trate assets of enemy corporations and to wind up foreign busi-
nesses (in this case, a bank) without any violation of the Hague
Regulations.154 In a subsequent affair, Gibbs v. Rodriguez,155 the
same court held to its previous ruling and maintained that those
acts constituted "a mere sequestration of private property, not in
excess of those limited rights granted to such occupants under In-
ternational Law."56 These solutions represent the positive inter-
national law as it exists now. A belligerent occupant is
empowered to liquidate all foreign assets when it has good reason
to suspect hostility.1
57
153. This has been admitted by the British Chancery Court, in Bank of Ethio-
pia v. Natl Bank of Egypt & Ligouri, 1 Ch. 513 (1937), and by a Singaporean tribu-
nal, in the Public Trustee case, supra note 31 (which held lawful the liquidation of
foreign branches of banks whose business could not be carried on, since liquida-
tion was reasonably necessary for the preservation of the assets or for the orderly
administration of the territory).
154. 18 I.LR. 642 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1948). See note 73 supra.
155. Gibbs v. Rodriguez, 18 LL.R. 661, 696 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1950).
156. See also DAs, supra note 14, at 100; Feliciano, supra note 14, at 694.
157. The U.S. ARmy AND NAVY MANUAL OF M=IARY GOvERmiENT AND CrvIL AF-
FAIRS 18, para. 12 (1) (Dec. 22, 1943) (FM 27-5, OPNAV 50E-3) instructs theatre
commanders of United States forces in case of "occupation of foreign territories
for a considerable period of time," as follows:
1. Money and Banking.
Closing, if necessary, and guarding of banks, bank funds, safe deposit
boxes, securities and records; providing interim banking and credit needs;
liquidation, reorganization, and reopening of banks at appropriate times;
regulation and supervision of credit cooperatives and other financial agen-
cies and organizations; execution of policies on currency fixed by higher
authority, such as the designation of types of currency to be used and
rates of exchange; supervision of the issue and use of all types of money
and credit; declaration of debt moratoria; prevention of financial transac-
tions with enemy occupied or enemy territory.
In brief, the existence of these belligerent occupants' monetary
rights does not seem seriously questionable. However, the scope
of the rights is rather poorly defined and must be constructed
from the general duties imposed on the occupant under the inter-
national law of belligerent occupation. 5 8
The Duties of the Belligerent Occupant Regarding Currency
A belligerent occupant is under a general duty to act within the
limits of its jurisdictional power and not to abuse its rights. This
customary rule of international law is usually too vague to be
practicably and objectively applicable, 5 9 and thus its content has
to be precisely determined whenever possible.
Does the belligerent occupant have any specific duties in con-
nection with the issuance and management of occupation cur-
rency? Is it obliged to back the new currency, to establish a
"realistic" rate of exchange, and to avoid inflation? Such are the
most controversial issues which raise more questions than an-
swers. International law cannot be expected to set forth techni-
cal, mandatory rules in these fields because the belligerent
occupant has the widest range of means. Nevertheless, it is sub-
mitted that international law imposes a certain standard of con-
duct from which the occupant is not entitled to depart.
No duty to back the occupation currency
In this respect, the practices followed by States differ greatly.
For instance, Germany in World War I and II provided for a back-
ing or cover of its war notes by employing several devices, such as
loans or deposits in its own currency,160 credits on occupation
costs,' 6 ' and general mortgages on the land of the occupied coun-
tries.162 Likewise, the Japanese guaranteed their war notes in the
Philippines and made it clear that they took "full responsibility
158. It is worthy of note that in order to deny a belligerent occupant the power
to introduce a new currency or to fix a certain rate of exchange, Polish, Lux-
embourger and Burmese courts have relied on this theory and have proceeded by
way of sweeping and persuasive affirmations. See notes 60, 69 & 71 supra.
159. See, e.g., FEmCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 70; PETRov, supra note 5, at 32;
Mann, supra note 146, at 93; note 5 supra.
160. Id.
161. LEmKIN, supra note 15, at 54.
162. These facts are excerpted from Haw-Pia v. The China Banking Corp., 18
LL.R. 642, 655 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1948). The Japanese did the same in Singapore and
Malaya, where unsigned notes bore the legend: 'The Japanese Government
promises to pay the bearer on demand." DAs, supra note 14, at 100. A Singapore
court, in the Public Trustee case, rightly conceded that such a "promise ... obvi-
ously would not be fulfilled at face value if [the Japanese] were defeated." 23
I.L.R. 687-96 (Org. Civ. Jur., Singapore, 1956).
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for their usage, having the correct amount to back them up,"'163 al-
though they did not mention the type of monetary backing.
On the contrary, the Allies in World War II did not envisage
this problem or no backing of the occupation currencies was
deemed necessary.164 Similarly, there was no "promise to pay the
bearer" or any other inscription or signature on these war notes
which could lead to the conclusion that the Allies had undertaken
any obligation or engaged their credit toward the occupied
country. 16 5
The Allies approach seems to be the correct view, correspond-
ing to reality and accepted by international law as well. For, in
fact, it is well known that the amount of the foreign exchange,
gold or other coverage used to back a national currency is not,
even in peacetime, the proper yardstick to evaluate the sound-
ness of a monetary system. What really counts is the strength of
the national economy. In wartime, due to the almost inescapable
disruption of national economies, the primary element is the ex-
pectancy of victory. The turn of the war constitutes the real psy-
chological backing (the confidence element) of any occupation
currency.
1 6 6
Furthermore, the presence or absence of a "promise to pay to
the bearer" in gold or silver the amount of the sum inscribed on a
bank note appears rather superfluous today, because such cur-
rency convertibility has since ceased to exist for 40 to 50 years in
every country, without exception. Recently, such a promise dis-
appeared from United States Federal Reserve notes. Thus, it
163. NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 497-98. LESTER, supra note 27, at 2, is right
when he describes military currency as pure "fiat money." Feliciano, supra note
14, at 663, mentions that none of the fiat money emitted by the Japanese had any
coverage, metal or otherwise.
164. NusSBAUM, supra note 3, at 498; U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 95-
96; LESTER, supra note 27, at 2.
165. In Gibbs v. Rodriguez, 18 LL.R. 661 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1950), a carefully
weighted decision, the Philippine Supreme Court very sensibly pointed out that
"[i]f the Japanese war notes became depressed and valueless, it was because the
war was prolonged and lost by the Japanese contrary to their expectation of win-
ning the war in a short, time .... ." Id. at 669 (Emphasis added).
166. MANN, supra note 3, at 509, 511. Mann attaches great importance to this
question of cover but he does not seem to make it a prerequisite for the legality of
the issuance of an occupation currency. Id. However, Fraleigh, supra note 26, at
115, writes that "presumably currency issued by an occupant should have cover-
age." But he does not justify his contention, while recognizing the problems
raised by his proposal: who is going to furnish this cover what kind of "adequate"
cover?
would be unreasonable and contrary to all modern monetary ex-
periences to compel the belligerent occupant to provide for a
backing of occupation currency with (or without) a promise to
pay.167 No rule of international law can be invoked to require it to
do what most States in peacetime refuse to do.168
No duty to impose a fair and reasonable rate of exchange
States have followed a universal pattern in one respect: when
they have issued war notes or introduced their own currency dur-
ing the first period of occupation, they have always overvalued
their money and consequently undervalued enemies' currency.169
It is true that in exceptional cases an opposite result was ob-
tained in reoccupied Allied territory (as in France), 7 0 and in en-
emy territories as in Italian Tripolitania. But, in the former case
this was done purposely for political reasons, and in the latter
case, this appreciation was due to unexpected economic and psy-
chological reasons.171 These are only exceptions that prove the
rule, and they are not significant enough to permit serious doubt
in the general trend.
These overvaluations of occupation currencies in comparison
with the pre-war official rates greatly varied from a range of a low
10 percent to sky-high levels of as much as 3 to 4,000 percent. 72
Such highly inflated, fictitious rates of exchange are extremely
useful to belligerent occupants, who can buy for a song all of the
economic output of the occupied country and thereby enrich
themselves unduly and strip the occupied territory of its wealth.
This has been correctly described as "legalized looting" of the oc-
cupied territory.173 Obviously, such extremes have to be con-
demned and constitute international wrongdoings. It is difficult,
167. See in the same sense, NUSSBAUM, supra note 3, at 498; Feliciano, supra
note 14, at 698.
168. See e.g., LEDN, supra note 15, at 52; LE TER, supra note 27, at 4; PETRov,
supra note 5, at 31, 78, 172-73, 195 (particularly pp. 252-53).
169. Id. at 64-65; Kemmerer, supra note 19, at 92.
170. See the facts in Nicolo v. Creni, 19 I.L.R. 145 (Court of Cassation, Italy,
1952).
171. PETROV, supra note 5, at 252-53. Petrov estimates that the Germans over-
valued their war notes which they introduced by an average of 25% to 30%. The
Russians overvalued currency by up to 4;000%, and the Allies (United Kingdom
and United States) in Italy and Germany overvalued their currency by about 200%
to 300%. This last figure would be contested by Kemmerer, supra note 19, at 89,
who affirms that the Allies undervalued their own currencies and accordingly
overvalued the lira and the Reichmarks.
172. U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 98.
173. American, German, Italian, Malayan, Filipino, Polish, and Singaporean
courts have recognized the validity of overvalued occupation currencies. See notes
59, 61-66 supra.
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however, to draw a clear-cut objective line between what rates of
exchange should be held unlawful because fictitious.
Perhaps surprisingly, the general principle seems to be that
overvaluated occupation currencies are not internationally unlaw-
ful. Overvaluation in itself is not illegal and condemned by inter-
national law. Most national courts have held valid the issuance of
occupation currencies despite their obvious inflated rates of
exchange.17 4
The crux of the problem consists of a question of degree in the
overvaluation of an occupation currency. 7 5 Compelling practical
reasons push in this direction. A rule of international law to the
contrary prescribing the belligerent occupant to respect and en-
force the pre-war rates of exchange between the two national cur-
rencies would be highly unrealistic. First, how does one fix the
proper period of reference to adopt this pre-war rate: at the time
of the declaration of war or of the crossing of the borders by the
enemy's army or of the complete and definitive military occupa-
tion of the country concerned? Secondly, what rate of exchange
is to be adopted: the official one prevailing on the market (i.e.
stock exchange of the occupied State) or the one prevailing on
the official market of the occupying country; the rate of exchange
on some free (or official) market of a third country or else the
174. Burmese and Luxemburger courts emphasized that the overvaluation of
occupation currencies was "ultra vires" of the belligerent occupant. The High
Court of Burma in the Taik case specified that it was "entirely beyond the [Japa-
nese military authorities'] competence ... [to equate] their currency to the law-
ful currency of [Burma]." Taik v. Ariff Moosa Jee Dooply, 15 Am. DIG. 576, 582
(High Court, Burma, 1948). The Burma Supreme Court reached the same conclu-
sion in Dooply v. Chan Talk, 19 ANN. DIG. 619 (Sup. Ct., Burma, 1950), as did the
District Court of Luxembourg in G. v. H., 18 LL.R. 633 (Dist. Ct, Luxembourg,
1951) which found that there was "no convention authorizing [the belligerent oc-
cupant] to fix, in a manner which is arbitrary and damaging to the inhabitants of
the occupied territory, the exchange rate of [its] own currency in relation to that
of the occupied territory, and to decree that it shall be legal and compulsory
tender." Id. at 634. If this principle in itself is sound, although probably too
strictly formulated, the same cannot be said of its appreciation in these two cases.
175. In the same sense, see FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 81-82; HYDE, supra
note 25, at 1897; MANN, supra note 3, at 513-14; LEMnIN, supra note 15, at 52, 55, 58;
OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 437-38 n.4; VoN GLAHN, supra note 15, at 203; Army
Field Manual, supra note 60, at 157-58. However, the Polish Supreme Court recog-
nized the lawfulness of the occupation "zlotys" issued by the Germans, although
they "were meant to serve the purpose of exploiting the economic wealth of the
country to the advantage of the occupant and to the detriment of the population."
Wladislaw F. v. Mebli, 26 LLR 719, 721 (Sup. Ct., Poland, 1947). After such a find-
ing, the court would have been entitled to condemn the German monetary
measures.
rate of exchange on the black market? Thirdly, what if official
rates of exchange are not determined by the free forces of the
marketplace, as in Western-type stock exchanges, but rather by
arbitrary and authoritarian decisions of governments, as is the
case of Socialist countries? All of these uncertainties cannot be
met by a specific and precise rule of international law, admitting
as lawful a certain overvaluation, such as 50 percent with respect
to the pre-war official rate of exchange. It would be unworkable
for the aforementioned reasons. Rather it is more fruitful to try to
determine an abstract, broad and flexible rule which would prima-
rily take into account the economic results or harm caused to the
occupied country by the overvaluation of the occupation currency.
In other words, here again, the guiding principles will have to be
found in a functional approach.
Any rate of exchange imposed by the belligerent occupant
which 1) would result in its undue enrichment by stripping the
occupied country of its wealth up to a point of economic ruina-
tion,176 2) would be equated with a general and indiscriminate
money contribution aimed at confiscating private property,177 and
3) would pass as a deliberate goal of a nation-wide social transfer
of wealth' 78 should be held internationally unlawful. Such a ficti-
tious rate of exchange would not be in conformity either with the
occupant's obligation to maintain law and order in the occupied
country or with its limited right to raise money to compensate for
the occupation costs and military operations. 179 In short, it is as-
sumed that international law bars the belligerent occupant from
imposing economically ruinous or socially-oriented rates of ex-
change but does not prevent it from introducing an overvaluated
occupation currency to the extent that the currency's rate of ex-
change is fair and reasonable.
A limited duty to avoid inflation
Avoidance of inflation is not only in the interest of the inhabit-
ants of the occupied territory but also in those of the occupant,
for a creeping inflation will have the result of overvaluing the oc-
cupation currency. 80 As a matter of fact, all belligerent occu-
176. Accord, Kemmerer, supra note 19, at 88; McNAm & WATTS, supra note 26,
at 319; Army Field Manual, supra note 60, at 157.
177. See PETROV, supra note 5, at 173, 177.
178. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 82.
179. Id.; LESTER, supra note 27, at 16-17.
180. See generally PETROV, supra note 5; LEMKin, supra note 15, at 53; Feliciano,
supra note 14, at 697. However, the Germans were seemingly successful in keep-
ing the rise in prices within reasonable bounds during their occupation of Norway.
See Stabell, Enemy Legislation and Judgments in Norway, 31 J. Comp. LEGIS. &
INT'L LAw 3, 8 (1949).
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pants have adopted drastic measures to avoid and limit inflation
through stringent price controls, but almost all have failed.181 In-
flation in militarily occupied areas and in most peacetime national
economies is a common phenomenon.
Inflation in occupied countries is actually inevitable because of
too many adverse factors. The occupied country has probably
built up a war-like economy with all the disequilibriums which
constitute corresponding causes of inflation; and a military defeat,
by the very nature of things, is likely to free all of the economic
inflationary evils. Furthermore, extra economic disruption is ad-
ded by the mere presence of an occupation army, thus increasing
the ratio between active and inactive populations. Finally, infla-
tion may also be increased by such perfectly lawful measures of
the belligerent occupant as contributions or requisitions imposed
to meet the military needs of the occupying army.182
A belligerent occupant cannot be held responsible for a creep-
ing inflation to the extent that the occupant has not voluntarily
contributed to it by a '"printing-press' 83 monetary policy, for ex-
ample. 184 On the other hand, the occupation currency may pro-
gressively deteriorate and fall to a fantastic discount, like the
German Mark in 1923, to finally become almost valueless because
of excessive money issues by a belligerent occupant. In such a
case the occupant will have trespassed the international law stan-
dard, not for failing to prevent inflation which the occupant very
likely cannot do,185 but for having contributed to a catastrophic in-
flation. In other words, international law does not require bellig-
erent occupants to curb any depreciation of the occupation
currency leading to moderate inflationary pressures in the occu-
pied territory; but, international law does prevent belligerent oc-
cupants from inducing catastrophic inflation by, among other
means, flooding the country with uncontrolled monetary emis-
sions. 86 There cannot be imposed upon the belligerent occupant
181. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 26, at 82; FRALEIGH, supra note 26, at 114.
182. Public Trustee case, supra note 31, at 696.
183. In the same sense, see Feliciano, supra note 14, at 697; FMALEIGH, supra
note 26, at 114.
184. See note 157 supra.
185. See MANN, supra note 3, at 513 (who condemns an "extraordinary increase
of the quantity of circulating money").
186. It is difficult to follow completely Professor Mann when he writes that the
"occupant commits a breach of duty if he promotes, or at least does not stop, infla-
tion and depreciation of the value of money." Id. (emphasis added). Fraleigh is
a general duty to avoid any inflation in the occupied territory. 87
Summary
The disequilibrium between the great number and extent of a
belligerent occupant's rights regarding currency and its limited
obligations may be a frustrating, disappointing conclusion, al-
though inescapable if the law in books has to coincide with the
law in action. It has been the basic idea of this article that any
realistic international standard of conduct in this area of the law
of belligerent occupation is dictated by the economics of modem
wartime and peacetime monetary experiences. The next phase,
the liquidation of military currencies, is dominated by political
rather than economic or purely legal considerations.
III. THE POST-WAR IMPACT OF THE MONETARY MEASURES
ADOPTED BY THE BELLIGERENT OCCUPAN-IT
At the end of the war, the monetary measures introduced by
the belligerent occupant have to be liquidated, except of course,
in a case of debellatio. Liquidation raises certain problems, two of
which are clearly within the realm of public international law and
a third problem bordering on international law but more likely re-
lated to private, domestic law. 88 First, when a new military cur-
rency had been issued and now has to be redeemed or exchanged
for the lawful currency of the returning sovereign, who will bear
the responsibility and the costs of this operation? Secondly, when
the occupied territory is reacquired by the former sovereign, what
are its rights and obligations, if any, with regard to the monetary
measures imposed by the belligerent occupant? Finally, what are
the after effects on private debts of the introduction of war notes
in the occupied territory?
The Responsibility for Redemption of the Military Occupation
Currency
A responsibility for redemption may be vested either in the bel-
ligerent occupant or in the occupied territory, according to the
practical circumstances of the case and the legality (or illegality)
of the monetary measures concerned. However, peace treaties
have generally disregarded these academic niceties, and the bur-
right when he mentions that "[a duty to prevent currency depreciation] is too
heavy a burden to place upon an occupant .... [T]he most that can be said is
that an occupant is not authorized to take certain types of action which tend to
cause currency depreciation." FRALEIGH, supra note 26, at 113-14.
187. MANN, supra note 3, at 514-15.
188. Id. at 11, 24.
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den of redeeming occupation currency has been borne by the de-
feated side. Such a result is legally disappointing but in practice
unavoidable.
Responsibility of the former belligerent occupant
Placing the burden on the defeated side would be a logical solu-
tion if the belligerent occupant had introduced its own currency,
declared its assumption of full responsibility for the new cur-
rency, or acted unlawfully in the monetary area. In the first hy-
pothesis, the occupied country would have acquired valid claims
against the occupant's currency and economy, which explains
why this technique is very seldom used or is employed only dur-
ing the first phase of occupation.189 In the second case, assump-
tion of responsibility is extremely rare and is sufficiently self-
explanatory to not require any further comment.190 Finally, the
third possibility of unlawful actions would result in a sort of pen-
alty, aimed at discouraging misconduct and poor administration
by the belligerent occupant who failed to respect its duties under
international law. In all other instances, the restored government
of the occupied territory should be held liable.191
Responsibility of the occupied country
In all cases where the former belligerent occupant has acted
lawfully under international law, the occupied country should
bear the responsibility for the redemption of the occupation cur-
rency. This would be the logical conclusion because it is here as-
sumed that the interests of the occupied territory have been
carefully respected and that it has only suffered the economic
hardships inherent in any war and occupation situation.
Such an objective pattern would have the great advantage of
ensuring a rule of law and of avoiding the damaging uncertainties
due to the turn of the war. But unfortunately, these proposed so-
189. Id. at 30.
190. There is no evidence to support Nolde's statement that "la liquidation des
mesures relatives au papier-monnaie, qui peuvent 4tre introduites par 1Etat occu-
pant, appartient en droit A ce dernier." Nolde, supra note 13, at 311. His reliance
on the 1929 Germano-Belgian convention on marks, note 34 upra, is inconclusive,
because this agreement constitutes a very weak precedent, if any, "the two parties
maintaining their legal standpoint" See NUSSBAUld, supra note 3, at 499-500.
191. See MANN, supra note 3, at 512; Feliciano, supra note 14, at 698-99. See also
Haw-Pia v. The China Banking Corp., 18 I.L.R 642, 659 (Sup. Ct, Phil., 1948).
lutions are contradicted by the universal practice of States as it
appears from peace treaties, which only recognize might and the
law of the jungle.
The peace treaties solution: responsibility of the defeated
side
If the former belligerent occupant is the victor, it will impose
the burden of redemption, as well as a war indemnity to cover oc-
cupation and other military costs, on the defeated countries it oc-
cupied during the war.192 This was the policy of the Allies after
World War 11. Thus, peace treaties with Italy,193 Rumania,194 and
Hungary' 95 contain a standard clause according to which these
governments "shall assume full responsibility for all Allied mili-
tary currency issued in [their countries] by the Allied military
authorities, including all such currency in circulation at the com-
ing into force of the present Treaty."196 A similar but milder pro-
vision may be found in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955.197
If the former belligerent occupant is defeated, the former occu-
pied countries will usually require it to pay a compensation
equivalent to the redemption of the occupation currency plus oc-
cupation costs.198 After World War I, Rumania' 99 and Belgium2OO
succeeded through efficient political pressures in imposing on
Germany an indemnity corresponding to the losses they had al-
legedly suffered because of the introduction of an occupation cur-
rency.201 Likewise, this was the common view held by the Allies
in World War II regarding war notes which they progressively is-
sued.202 In the "Draft Agreement on Reparations from Germany,"
192. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 76, para. 4, 49 U.N.T.S. 3.
193. Treaty of Peace with Roumania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 30, para. 4, 42 U.N.T.S. 3.
194. Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 32, para. 4, 41 U.N.T.S. 135.
195. Id.
196. The State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent Austria, May
15, 1955, art. 24, para. 4, 217 U.N.T.S. 233, provides that Austria will assume full re-
sponsibility for Allied military currency of denominations of five shillings and
under; the higher notes issued by the Allies shall be destroyed, Austria waiving
any claims against the Allies in this respect.
197. See note 5 supra.
198. Convention of Nov. 10, 1928 between Roumania and Germany, Martens
Nouveau Recuefl 484 (3d ser. (21)).
199. Agreement between Germany and Belgium Regarding the Marks, Jul. 13,
1929, 104 L.N.T.S. 202.
200. As already mentioned, the legal value of these agreements as precedent is
very weak, because in both cases the legal controversy between the contracting
parties was brushed aside in the preambles. Id. See also MANN, supra note 3, at
512-13.
201. U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 29, 115, 117-18.
202. Quadripartite Agreement for Control of Germany by Allied Representa-
tives, Sept. 20, 1945, para. 20, in 3 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNTED STATES OF AMERICA 1949-1976, at 1254-58 (C. Bevans ed. 1969).
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the Allies agreed to include in their official claims the "costs of
German occupation, credits during occupation on clearing ac-
counts and claims against the Reichskreditkassen."2 3
No peace treaty has yet been concluded with Germany; but the
Allies (except Russia) recognized in a peace treaty with Japan
that Japan was unable to pay damages and "maintain a viable
economy" because of insufficient economic resources.20 4 A simi-
lar conclusion was reached for Italy shortly after the signing of a
peace treaty in 1947.205 So, in these last two cases, the burden of
redemption was actually shifted because of the insolvency of the
defeated countries.206 Finally, the inhabitants of the occupied ter-
ritories had "to suffer, as everybody else, the losses incident to all
wars," to use the words of the Philippines Supreme Court in the
Haw-Pia case.207
Thus, the soundness of the principle, that the responsibility for
the redemption of occupation currencies should be borne by the
ex-enemy governments and is the "natural and convenient thing
in the circumstances," 208 is questionable in two respects. First,
this principle overlooks any question of international legality of
the actions of the belligerent occupant; the problem of responsi-
bility for redemption should be linked to the legality of the cur-
rency's issuance and management of the occupation currency, not
to the issue of wars. Secondly, the improbability that the de-
feated powers would pay makes this solution practically unwork-
able. Neither the rule of law nor the inhabitants of the occupied
territory have anything to gain with this type of expedient.
Identical, unsatisfactory results are reached when, at the end of
the occupation, the legitimate State regains jurisdiction over its
formerly occupied territory.
203. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14, para. a, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 60.
204. In a Memorandum of Understanding of Aug. 14, 1947, "[to alleviate] several
of the burdensome economic and financial clauses of the Italian peace treaty," the
United States Government waived its claims for certain types of occupation costs
(including the military currency, Art. 9-6) totaling $305 million. Financial and Eco-
nomic Understandings with Italy, Summary of Deliberations, 17 DEPT STATE
BuLL. 371 (1947).
205. Feliciano, supra note 14, at 698-99.
206. 18 LLR. 642, 659 (Sup. Ct. Phil, 1948).
207. Fitzmaurice, supra note 63, at 343.
208. On this problem, see generally FICEmcENFELD, supra note 26, at 144; Felici-
ano, supra note 14, at 689-90.
Postliminy Law with Respect to Monetary Problems
When the occupation is over and the legitimate government is
restored, the fate of the monetary measures adopted by the occu-
pant has to be settled. The basic question is to determine what
importance will be given by the returning sovereign to the acts of
the belligerent occupant. This area of the law arising from
changes of jurisdiction, known as "intertemporal or postliminy
law" (jus postliminii), is usually governed by the commanding
test of international validity, for example, whether or not the acts
performed by the occupant were lawful under international
law.209 But the recent tendency, as clearly shown by modern
States' practices, is to set aside the test of international legality
for the benefit of policy considerations. The monetary field illus-
trates this trend.
An obligation on the part of the returning sovereign to
respect the lawful acts of the former belligerent
occupant
The almost unanimous opinion of writers is that restored gov-
ernments are under the obligation to respect lawful, authorized
acts of occupants. Restored governments cannot annul these acts.
Pillet states that there exists "a general law of validity" applying
to the acts of the belligerent occupant on the condition, however,
that "he has not acted beyond the limits attached to his powers
by international law." 210  Likewise, Spaight affirms that
"[c] onsiderations of general convenience approve the rule that
acts done by the occupant, within his powers as an occupant,
stand. But he must not have exceeded those powers."21 1 The
same writer adds that the occupant cannot bind its successor, the
legal ruler beyond the duration of its occupancy, "for to do so
would be to encroach on the latter's sovereignty."
2 12
According to Pillet, if this were not so, it would mean a paraly-
sis of social life, and persons would refuse to enter into any legal
relationships should they foresee that all transactions during the
occupation period would be voided at the end of hostilities.2 1 3 In
the same line, Spaight emphasizes that "to deny the validity of
such acts would . . . bring the social life of a community to a
standstill during occupation... ,would be unjust to the individ-
ual inhabitants, and impolitic as regards the community at
209. PLLET, supra note 24, at 255.
210. SPAiGHT, supra note 24, at 367.
211. Id. See also Mix, supra note 93, at 483; WESTLAKE, supra note 101, at 18.
212. PILLET, supra note 24, at 255.
213. SpAxGHT, supra note 24, at 366.
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large."214 The least that can be said, however, is that when States
have chosen to validate monetary measures introduced by the
belligerent occupant, they have done so freely by their own
choice and not under the obligation of a recognized rule of inter-
national law.
No obligation on the part of the returning sovereign to
invalidate the unlawful acts of the former belligerent
occupant
While most writers are split on this issue, the majority share
the opinion that no obligation exists to invalidate prior unlawful
acts. Where the acts of the former occupant were clearly unlaw-
ful, the restored government is free to recognize them or not.2 1 5
Hyde makes an extreme contention that the Supreme Court of
the Philippines in the Haw-Pia case committed a violation of in-
ternational law in recognizing the validity of Japanese military
monetary decrees and that the Philippines might be responsible
for the violation. This contention is groundless, even were he cor-
rect in saying that the Japanese actions were internationally un-
lawful.2 16 There is no precedent, no example whatsoever, to
affirm that a returning sovereign commits a breach of interna-
tional law when it fails to invalidate unauthorized monetary (or
other) measures taken by a belligerent occupant.
Scope of the returning government's freedom in its
recovered sovereignty
Contemporary States' practices clearly show that returning sov-
ereigns have acknowledged no duty regarding the currency man-
agement undertaken by former military occupants. They have
felt completely free to install a monetary reform and to determine
its extent and character as they thought fit.217
One can sympathize with Pillet when he writes that if the "re-
stored, legal government was allowed to nullify the [lawful] acts
done by his enemy, the existence of an international law of bellig-
214. Feliciano, supra note 14, at 699; McNAiR & WATrS, supra note 26, at 369-70.
But see FRALEIGH, supra note 26, at 96 (whose views seem inconsistent with this
position); Hyde, note 12 supra.
215. Id. at 141, 163.
216. Feliciano, supra note 14, at 703; FRALEiGH, supra note 26, at 117; MANN,
supra note 3, at 514-15.
217. Pnx T, supra note 24, at 255.
erent occupation would lose the greatest part of its usefulness;" 218
however, no present rule of positive international law prevents
the returning sovereign from doing so, at least in the monetary
area. Postwar legislation regarding private debts constitutes a
good example of this regrettable gap in international law.
Military Occupation Monetary Experiences and Private Debts
Monetary measures adopted by belligerent occupants are very
likely to affect and disrupt debtor/creditor relationships up to a
point where the returning sovereign will be obliged to intervene
through appropriate legislation. This primarily raises questions
of domestic law which, as such, are beyond the ambit of this arti-
cle. 219 In light of the postliminy law principles, however, is the re-
turning sovereign obliged to adopt certain types of solutions, (for
example, revalorization legislation) and failing to do so, may the
sovereign be held internationally responsible?
The policy of returning governments regarding private debts:
a general pattern
Pre-war obligations and payments in occupation currency
The general rule is that payments in occupation currency (de-
preciated or not) are to be held valid at face value.220 This is the
common view of national courts (except Burmese and Luxem-
bourg tribunals which have rejected the validity of such dis-
charges).221 Also, the rule represents current policies of States,
according to their revalorization or debtor/creditor legislations.
Revaluations are only marginally significant for certain types of
socially privileged debts or in a case of coercion.222 The Dutch in
Indonesia, however, provided for a complete revalorization of pay-
ments made during occupation to discharge pre-war debts.223
This occurrence is considered to be exceptional.
218. MA=N, supra note 3, at 514-15.
219. FRALEiGH, supra note 26, at 108; DAs, supra note 14, at 105.
220. Talk v. Ariff Moosa Jee Dooply, 15 ANN. DIG. 576 (High Court, Burma, 1948);
G. V. H., 18 LL.R. 633 (Dist. Ct., Luxembourg, 1951).
221. In the case of Malaya, see O'Connor, supra note 14, at 7.
222. Feliciano, supra note 14, at 702; DAs, supra note 14, at 107.
223. See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 7; Wladislaw F. v. Mebli, 26 LL.R. 719 (Sup.
Ct., Pol., 1947). See generally the Philippine decisions, which have consistently
held that "payment made in Japanese money for obligations contracted before and
during the war was valid and extinguished such obligations." Singson v. Veloso,
23 LL.R. 800, 800 (Ct. App., Phil., 1955).
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Obligations entered into and payments made in occupation
currency during the occupation period
It is the general opinion of national courts, and the policy of
States as well, that face value should be given to such pay-
ments.2 24 On the contrary, the Hong Kong Supreme Court limited
the application of this principle to unchallenged payments and
admitted a revaluation at the end of the war when the creditor
had refused to receive a payment in highly depreciated, occupa-
tion currency for full discharge.
5
Obligations entered into during the occupation period and
maturing after the end of the war
The general tendency of legislatures has been to accept the va-
lidity of these transactions, while providing for a revalorization of
debts according to a scheduled rate of conversion for the occupa-
tion currency and giving due consideration to the progressive de-
preciation of that currency. 6 National courts have reached
similar results, 227 although in some instances they have recog-
nized valid discharge of such debts in worthless occupation cur-
rencies2 28 or have imposed a payment at face value in the newly
reestablished currency.229 In both cases this is obviously unfair,
224. Tse Chung v. Lee Yau Chu, 18 LLR. 636 (Sup. Ct., Hong Kong, 1951).
225. See the revalorization legislations in Burma, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ma-
laya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei. For a more detailed analysis
of these statutes, see DAs, supra note 14, at 110-19; Maung, supra note 14, at 14-15;
O'Connor, supra note 14, at 6-8.
226. In the Philippines, the courts have implemented a judiciary revaluation of
such debts. See Feliciano, supra note 14, at 692-94. While in Poland, for instance,
some courts seem to have allowed a dissolution or a modification of contracts, with
insufficient payments in highly depreciated occupation currency constituting ex-
onerating, exceptional circumstances. Editor's note following Wladyslaw F. v.
Mebli, 26 IL.R. 719, 721 (Sup. Ct., Pol., 1947).
227. See Wladyslaw F. v. Mebli, 26 LL.R. 719 (Sup. Ct., PoL, 1947). However, this
ruling relies on very practical circumstances, which left no choice to the court.
228. See the British decisions, In re Chesterman's Trusts, 2 Ch. 466 (1923); Rus-
sian Commercial & Indus. Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade, Ltd., 2 A.C. 438
(1922).
229. DAs, supra note 14, at 107. It is to be noted that deposits in banks and,
more generally, bank accounts in occupation currency have been treated less fa-
vorably than other private monetary claims. The Supreme Court of the Philip-
pines in Hilado v. de la Costa, decision of April 30, 1949, summarized in 44 Am. J.
INT'L L 211-12 (1949), held that deposits in Japanese military currency could not
be equated with deposits identical in kind and nature denominated in lawful Phil-
ippine currency, "particularly in view of the fact that, after liberation, such notes
have no real value." The general principle seems to be that the depositor shall
the risk of fluctuation having been flatly thrown on the creditor or
on the debtor and not shared between them equitably.
23 0
Revalorization of private debts and international law
It is of cardinal importance for private creditors who are nation-
als of third States to know whether or not there exists a rule of
international law prescribing the restored government to
revalorize discharged debts in greatly depreciated occupation cur-
rency through appropriate legislation (or through the judicial
branch). Professor Hyde vehemently criticized the Haw-Pia rul-
ing231 of the Supreme Court of the Philippines which recognized
that the Japanese Military notes issued during the period of occu-
pation were legal tender and could validly discharge at par a peso
debt. He submitted that this decision constituted "internationally
illegal conduct on the part of the Philippine Government which is
productive of a solid claim for compensation in behalf of alien na-
tionals or creditors who suffered loss as a direct consequence of
such a decision."232 And Hyde added that this decision "would do
the utmost harm to American interest"; this is an obvious but in-
evitable result.
As a matter of fact, there is no rule of international law prohib-
iting the failure of a returning sovereign to enforce a legislative or
judicial revalorization of private debts.233 In other words,
revalorization measures (or the absence of them) adopted by the
restored government are irrelevent as a criterion of the lawful-
ness (or unlawfulness) of the former occupant's actions; they rep-
resent only the expression of sovereign policy decisions aimed at
social purposes. Creditors who were nationals of third States
would have a valid international claim against the returning gov-
ernment's refusal to enact a revalorization legislation if the re-
fusal was intended to injure foreigners (for instance, by
revaluating only debts owed to national creditors). In such a
case, this government would breach the minimum standard of
conduct any State must respect, and this would amount to an ob-
vious abuse of rights.
have to suffer the loss. See also Eisner v. U.S., 117 F. Supp. 197, 21 LL.R. 476 (Ct.
Cl. 1954) decided by the U.S. Court of Claims.
230. This article was carefully refuted by the Philippine Supreme Court in
Gibbs v. Rodriguez, 18 .L.R. 204 (Sup. Ct., Phil., 1950), and it appears that Hyde
missed the point and misinterpreted the Haw-Pia decision.
231. Hyde, supra note 13, at 141.
232. In the same sense, see MANN, supra note 3, at 514-15.
233. On the notion of abuse of rights applied to monetary matters, see Mann,
supra note 95, at 92-98.
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CONCLUSION
To summarize, the following principles are supportable by in-
ternational law:
1. The belligerent occupant unquestionably has the right to in-
troduce a new currency with or without any backing, to regulate
its value, to introduce exchange controls (or tighten existing
ones), to seize national and enemy monetary assets, and to adapt
the banking system of the occupied country to the new situation
arising from the war and occupation.
2. The occupant has the right to fix a rate of exchange between
the old currency, as established by the legitimate government,
and the new military currency being introduced. More specifi-
cally, it may overvalue its own currency, for example by underval-
uing the currency in circulation in the occupied territory,
although only within certain reasonable limits. These limits in-
clude unjust enrichments, deterioration and ruination of the econ-
omy of the occupied territory, and levying massive monetary
contributions.
3. As a general rule, the belligerent occupant cannot be held li-
able for the inflation occurring in the occupied territory unless it
has greatly contributed to this situation by grossly overvaluing
the new monetary unit it has introduced or by deliberately flood-
ing the country with worthless paper money.
4. The occupant should not be held responsible for redemption
of the military currency which it has issued unless the occupant
has acted unlawfully according to the above-mentioned criteria.
The occupied country should be liable for this redemption. How-
ever, this point seems rather academic since the solution will ac-
tually depend exclusively upon the turn of the war.
5. In the present state of international law, the returning sov-
ereign has no particular duty or obligation concerning the recog-
nition or the non-recognition of the monetary measures adopted
during the period of occupation by the military occupant. The
sovereign may accept the legality, completely refuse it, or accept
it beneficium inventarii.
6. These positive rules of international law governing the con-
duct of belligerent occupants in the monetary area may appear
loose and lenient and therefore rather disappointing. This inevi-
table result clearly illustrates the general lowering of the interna-
tional standards that belligerents are expected to respect. This
corresponds to a similar trend in peacetime standards. What the
international law of war has gained in scope, it has lost in depth.
